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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utab

l

WALKER RAI\;K AND TRUST COM)
PANYt a corporation,.
Plaintiff and Respondent_.

Case No.

vs.

~

J
~

NEW YORK TERMINAL WAREHOCSE COMPANY, a corporation~
Defendant a.nd Appellant .

9098

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintif fl s Case
Plaintiff~s

claim is hased on twelve (12) nonnegotiable
warehouse receipts, issued by defendant to plaintiff under
Utah~s Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act (Title 72, Utah
Code Annotated 1953) ~ covering certain automatic electric
washers and driers stored in defend.ant~s \Varehouse in Salt
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Lake City, Uta b Said goods are s.pecif ]cally identified in
the warehou~c t~eceipts by model number, name of manufacturer and serial number (R. 1, 18, Exhibit "P..-2") The
obligations.:t duties and responsibilities of defendant with
respect to said goods are set forth in said Act and the.
warehouse receipts in corp.orate the same therein by reference thereto (Exhibit ~'P-2~J).
I

I

Defendant was required to deliver said goods either
to plaintiff, as the holder of the warehouse receipts covering the same~ or to a person whom pJaintiff by written
authority had authorized tb e deli very of the same~ The
Utah Warehouse Receipts Act so provides and plaintiff so
admits Mr. C. J H o1t,. Vice President of defendantJ in
charge of 'Vest Coast Sa1es and Operations~ testified with
respect to the goods covered by said warehouse receipts~
as follows:
~' Q.
That is right, and these were the bank~a
goods? They were stored for the bank ?''
hA. Yes~ sir/'
+

r

'~Q.
bank~s

As far as you are concerned they were the
goods and stored for the account of the

bank?'~

"A.

That is right, sir/'

''Q. The point is they are stored for the account of Walker Ba11k a11d Trust Company1"
uAr That is correct, sir~n
"Q+ And as far as you are concerned~ the bank
the u\vner and en titled to possess ion of those
goods, isn't that correct?"
~~A~
That is right~ sir."'
IS
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HQ. And the hank' ~
-hA. Once the warehouse receipt has been
issued."
7

Once the warehouse receipt has been
issuedt as far as the warehouse company is concerned the bank owns those goods and it is en titled
to possession of them ?J'
"A.. That is rightn (R+ 90-91) .
''Q..

Printed forms design a ted ~'deli very order'' 'vere supplied by defendant :for use by plaintiff in authorizing delivery of the goods from ~aid warehouse (R. 79~ Exhibits
'~p....gn and "'P... 7'JI) ..
On May 10., 1957, without notifying plaintiff 7 defendant closed its ""'T areh o use at the 1oca tion where plain tiff~ s
goods had been stored and collected its storage charges~
for reasons which are apparent from inter-office communications shown in the appendix as Appendix '"'A"~~ ~"B",. "'C"
and ~'D', (R. 100-101, 202).
Following such c1 osing of the warehouse, plain tiff received from defendant certain delivery orders and checks
(Exhibit {jp-a,n). Said exhibit consists of six (6) delivery
ordersJ one of \vhich is dated May 1, 1957J one dated May
2, 1957, one dated May 3, 1957, two dated May 7, 1957 and
one dated May 10, 1957.. To each of said delivery orders
is attached a check signed by John R. Woods (Woods). The
check attached to the delivery order dated l\'Iay 7, 1957t is
blank as to the date,. payee and amount. Each of the remaining checks are payable to Walker Bank & Trust Company in an amount equal to the declared value of the goods
shown on the delivery order to which it is attached~ In
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each instance, said checks are dated subsequent to the date
of the delivery order .s~ except the check signed in bla.nk and
the check accompanying the delivery order dated May 10~
1957. The delivery orders are prepared for exec uti on by
Walker Bank & Trust Company to authorize delivery of
the goods described therein to vV ood s. Said deli very orders
1\-~ere never executed nor delivered by pla inti£ f to defendant (R. 19~ 124).
The goods desc1~ i bed in said deli very orders constituted
a part of the goods covered by the 'varehouse receipts on
Y.lhich this action is based and represented a substantial
part of all the goods covered by warehouse receipts issued
by defendant to plaintiff and held by plaintiff as security
for the payment of indebtedness o\Ving by Woods to plaintiff on promissory notes (R. 19, Exhibits ~~P-2H, ''P-3"J
"'D-8'~)
Neither the indebtedness evidenced by said promissory notes (\vhich exceeds the value of the goods) nor
the checks have been paid and Woods has been adjudicated
a bankrupt (R. 19~ Exhibit "1 -l~~).
L

1

Prior to the closing of said 1varehouse, the dates of the
delivery orders and of the checks~ the goods described in
said deli very orders had been delivered out of the warehouse
by d efen nant to a person or persons other than plaintiff
~in some instances, as hereinafter shcnvn, many months
prior to said times (R. 101, 152-155J 159-170J Exhibits
HP-15H-' P-20''~ incl., Appendix HE"). At the time of elosing the warehouse and as of the dates of said checks and
delivery orderst defendant knew that Woods was insolvent
( R. 151-152) ~
1
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Upon the foregoing facts~ p]aintl ff brought this action
against defendant for conversion of the goods described
in 8aid delivery orders~ the value of which \Vas stipulated
to by defendant (R. 37, Exhibit ~'P-4n).
Dej(JI.dant~s

Defendant'~

Affirmati"t:e Defenses

affirmative defenses to this .action are as

follows:

(1) That by an alleged agreement between plaintiff
and defendant the defendant \vas authorized to deliver the
goods in question to Wo-ods \vithout first obtaining- a delivery order executed by plaintiff, provided that defendantt
before such deli very of the goods, obtained from 'Voods a
check payable to plaintiff for the declared value of the
goods together \Vith a delivery order signed by Woods and
describing the goods to be delivered, such check and deJivery order to be forthwith for\varded to plaintiff (R. 8589).

(2)

That plaintiff is estopped because, as stated in

the pretrial order:
~"2.

Defendant also defends on the grounds of
estoppc] and in this respect represents that in holding the deliver:/ orders and checks for varying long
periods of time, the plaintiff led the defendant to
believe that delivery of the goods to John R. '\Voods
on the basis of a delivery order signed by him, and
'vithout p1aintiff's signature was sufficient authorization as far as the plaintiff was concerned.
",;It is understood in connection with this defense
that to prevail the defendant must show that the
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goods covered by the warehouse receipts in question
were delivered in accordance \vith such a practice.
~~rrhe

defendant urges this defense severa11y as
against each delivery~ and collectively't (R. 20).
With respect to the above defenses, the record shows
as fol1ows:
Defendant commenced in the spring of 1956 to store
goods covered by \V arehouse receipts issued to plaintiff {R.
117). rrhereafter, defendant executed and delivered to

plain tiff various deli very orders authorizing delivery of
the goods described therein~ commencing "\vitb a delivery
order dated 1\fay 21, 1956 (R. 72, Exhibit ''D~8"). In each
and every instance, plaintiff ohtained payment of the check
accompanying the delivery order before plaintiff executed
and delivered the delivery order to defendant (R. 114-115,
124~125).

Some months after the commencement of said transactionB ~ plaintiff, prompted by some request from defendant~
advised defendant by a letter dated October 16~ 1956~ as
to plaintiff's method of operation with respect to said warehouse receipts (R. 116-llSt Exhibit uD-5' 7 ) ~ In this. connection, the letter states that ''These receipts cover a ppliances~ and it is our method of operation that these units,
one or more, be paid for at the time they are withdrawn.''

On November 12, 1956J defendant replied to plaintiffs
letter, which~ among other things~ states, "and from your
letter interpret that you wish to authorize delivery from
the warehouse upon the receipt~ by our storekeeper, of a
check from John R~ Woods Co.~' Defendant's letter enclosed
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a proposed letter to be executed by plaintiff and sent to
defendant for authorizing the delivery of goods stored for
plaintiff upon receipt by defendant's storekeeper of Woods'
check~ but subject to certain limitations and restrictions as
set forth in said proposed letter (R. 119-120, Exhibit
~~n-6H). Plaintiff did not answer defendant's letter nor
send any letter such as propo.sed by defendant ( R. 119) .
The alleged Hgreement \vhich defendant relies upon
for its delivery of the goods from the warehouse without
a \Vritten delivery order authorizing the same, must be
gained from plaintiff's letter and defendant~~ reply theretot
and concerning this matter, lVIr~ Holt testified as follo\\o·s:
Now, Mr~ IIolt~ in a second defense which
is pleaded to our complaint in this action, it is alJeged that, 'For many months prior to May 1, 1957~
defendant'-that "rould be the warehouse company
-'had operated under a warehousing agreement by
the terms of which defendant \vas to release stored
goods upon receipt from John R. Woods, an appliance dealer, of a delivery order signed by him together \vith payment for the stored merchandise/
Is that correctu?
..:Q.

~'A.

That is

right~ yes~ sir.'~

And that agreement is to be gained from
the letter I\fr. Robbins wrote to you on October 16th~
1956, and your reply to that letter~~?
~'A.
Yes, sir r~'
~'Q~

~'Q.

)J"o,v it says: .cBy the terms of the ""~are
housing agreementt plaintiff~-that is the Walker
Bank and Trust Coupany-~\vas to sign the delivery
order received by it from defendant's Salt Lake City
storekeeper and send them to the defendant's Los
Angeles office as evidence of authority to deliver and
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delivery of the merchandise to John R. Woods or
his order.' Ts that correct?'~
',;A~
That is correct~' (Rr 88-89).
Concerning the allegations pLeaded in defendant's answer as a basis for its defense of estoppel~ Mr. Hoi t testified in respect thereto as foBows:
~'"Q.
There are some a1legations in here whlch
I may cover very quickly \vith a question--otherwise
I will be glad to go into them~VttThere they speak of
the bank giving credit to "\V oods and of overdrafts
I believe and so forth~ in transactions bet,veen the
bank and 'Voods ~ do you know anything about
those?''
,;"A-- N o, Str.
. ''

''Q. And did you at any time know anything
about it ?n
HA. No, sir/,

And I take it as a warehouseman generally
speaking you are not concerned v..,.ith any arrangements or transactions between the bank and its customer~ you are simply concerned with your duty as
warehouseman to store the goods and deliver them
upon receipt of the proper authority 7~'
'~A.
That is correct, sir. The only time we
have any kno,v]edge of what a loan percentage wouJd
be is 'vh et~e the bank specifics we pick up a given
percentage . ' 1
~.:Q..

'"~Q..
~~A..

As in the enclosed Jetter 'v hich you sent?"'
That is right', (R. 89).

Plaintiff's conduct in respect to a 11 the \varehousing
transactions mentioned in the record is entirely consistent
with the plain m ea.ning of plaintiff's letter of October 16t
1956, namely:t that plaintiff would execute and deliver a
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delivery order to defendant authorizing delivery of goods
from the warehouse to \Voods if and when Woods• check
accompanying the delivery order was paid by cash funds
in the bank.

Mr. H. A. Robbin~, a retired manager of defendant's
Murray Branch~ testified in behalf of defendant on direct
examination, as foHo\v~;
~~Q..

Did you ever send delivery orders to Los
Angeles without the checks having been paid before
that?"
"~A..
Not to my knowledge.''
"A.

Would you say that you had not done
I would have to say that."

"''Q..

~ras

~~Q~

so1~"

it your understanding while you were
holding the deli very orderH waiting for the check to
Clear, that the goods \Vere Still in the 'vareho USe ?''
'A. As far a!-; I knew~' (R. 115) ~
1

On cross examination pertaining to the same subject,
Mr.. Rob bins testified :

"'Q.

)J"o,v, in previou~ transactions evidenced
by delivery orders which have been submitted~ad
mi tted in evidence as Exhibit D-8, did you receive
these delivery orders accompanied by checks T'
"A. Yes~ sir/:t
1

'~Q~

Now you may state '"hether at any time
you signed those delivery orders and forwarded the
same to Los Angeles until you had actually received
funds to cover the checks ?''
"''A. That"s correct."'

""Q.. Now when you refer to 'payment/ in your
letter I think of October 16, 1956, do you refer to
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payment by checks which have been made good
through funds deposited in the account or do you
refer to simply the check itself?~~
''A. No, I don~t refer to the check itself. I
refer to the check that when it is actually paid,
payment would be when the check is actually paid~~
(R~ 125) .

Regarding the alleged agreement that defendant was
authorized to deliver goods from its warehouse to Woods
upon its receipt of a check from Woods and without a de ..
livery order signed by plaintiff Mr. Robbins testified as
follo\vs:
'~Q~
No\v~ if you \Vi11 listen to this question
carefully+ Did you have any agreement with Woods
at any time, written or otherwise~ whereby Mr.
Woods would be authorized to take those goods from
the warehouse prior to the time that you signed the
delivery order and the check whieh he brought in
was made good by fund~ in the bank?
J

7

'

~~A~~

N 011 s1r.
I

''

''Q. Did you ever have any such agreement or
understanding of any kind with the warehouse company1'"
"'~A..
NoJ sir.n

"'"Q+ Did you, as far as you can reca Ht ever
sign a delivery order and forward it to the warehouse company until you had funds in the bank to
pay the check that accompanied it?n
"'A. As I rt..~all it~ that"s true . "'
'"'Q+
~~A.

You never did ?"J
No~ sir~J (R . 221) ~

Corroborating the testimony of Mrr Robbins in regard
to the a11eged agreement and also the fact that defendant
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did not rely on any conduct of plaintiff in making delivery
of goods from its warehouRe

lA~ithout

obtaining a delivery
order t~xeeuted by plaintiff authorizing the same, are the
instructions of ~\'Ir~ T. B~ Akeleyt an auditor in defendant's
Los Angeles office (R. 147-148, Exhibit '~P-7"). Said instructions, which are dated April 2, 1957, and contain the
signature of defendant~s storekeeper, Harvey Rr Moorehead~' accepting the same under date of April3, 1957~ whose
signature is notarized on the same date, recite in said instructions the storage of the goods by defendant for plaintiff and defendant's i~suance of its \Varehouse receipts to
plaintiff for such goods, and then specifically provide~

"'"NO'V TIIEREFORE~ the WAREHOUSEMAN
does instruct and admonish its employees, viz . :
~~supervisor:P

~"Asst~
~'Asst.

'r

Harvey R. Ivloorehead, Storekeeper,
Storekeeper,
Asst. Storekeeper,
AssL Storekeeper,
Storekeeper,.

(the AREHOUSR EMPLOYEES) that the goods
deposited by the STORER in the lVAREHOUSE in
the name and for the a~count of the BANK can be
de1ivered only in strict accordance 'vith the follO\Ving instructions :
''1.

Pursuant to instructions from the BANK, the
\V.A.REHOUSEI\iAN is authorized to deliver
to the STORER only such goods as may be
specified on a Delivery Order signed by an individual duly authorized to Rign I<)r the B . 4.NKt
.
provided the follo~~ing instructions are com~
plied 'vith:
"A.

The Stor~keeper must actually have in his
possesl-lion a Delivery Order specifying
the goods to be delivered, signed by an
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individual authorized to sign for the
BANK before any goods can be delivered.
~'B.

"'"2.

Before the close of business of the day on
which goods are delivered from the
W AREHOl.1 SE, the Storekeeper~ or in his
absence one of the WAREHOUSE EMFLO YR ES listed herein, wi 11 personally
mall to thiH offiee with the Daily Report~
the original Delivery Order.

Unless the Storekeeper actually has received
Delivery Order duly signed by an individual
authorized to .sign for the BANK as specified
in Paragraph 1-A hereof and has mailed Delivery Order as specified in Paragraph 1-B
hereof, all \V AREHOUSE El\fPLOYEES are
forbidden to deliver, or permit anyone to remove, any goods from the WAREHOUSE.

~'A 11

previous instructions in reference to delivery of
goods from WAREHOUSE are hereby rescinded.'~
(Exhibit ~~P-7").
The Exhibitsf which are contained in the Appendix in
chrono1ogical order as Appendix '~A"~ ~~B'", "C", "D'' and
~'E'' ~ have a material bearing on defend ant's defenses based
on said alleged agreement and estoppel, as does also the
testimony of defendant ~s storekeeper :
I~m

asking you this ; With respect
to the performance of your duties as warehouseman,
whose directions did you follow in the performance
of those duties, ):lr. Woods or the directions of the
New York Terminal Warehouse Company?~~
"A. Well, I tried to fol1ow both as much as I
could. I depended on my job from Mr.. Woods but
''Q

r

Well}

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
I still wanted to do my best to follow the rules as
to the \Vay things had been going.~~
uQ.. So if :vrr. Woods told you to do something
with respect to your status as agent of the New York
Terminal \\rarehouse Company, very likely you
would follow his orders in that regard because of
your dual capacity there?''
"'A. Yes, sir" (R. 186-187) .

It is clear from these inter-office communications and
reports that at least as early as February 1, 1957, the defendant had abdicated its warehousing o:f plaintiff's goods
and the operations of its 'varehouse in favor of Woods,. notwithstanding the ''TaTehouse receipts covering said goods
were held by plaintiff to secure Woods' indebtedness to
plaintiff. I\~r Akeley~ defendanf'H auditor \vho had made
trips to Salt Lake City to audit the warehouse operations,
states as of February 1, 1957 (Exhibit "P-9H) :
L

,;rFrank1y~

he (Woods) runs the warehouse, and
he wiU continue to do so 'vith any employees we
might put in there, outside of ourselves.'"
It appears that defendant decided to assume the risk
for such breach of its oblig-ations and responsibilities as a
warehouseman rather than offend Woods or impair his
"good standing" \Vith plaintiff (Exhibit "P-12'~).
Consistent with defendanes reJinquishment of its warehouse to '\Voods, the record sho\vs that l.vhen YVoods obta)ned
an order for the purchase of goods stored in the 'varehouse,
defendant's storekeeper ,Nould remove goods from the v.r,.arehouse and accumulate them for as 1ong as two or three
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'veeks before he received a check from Woods and made
out a delivery order {R. 146, 148, 149) ~ In the event Woods
\\ra~ going to be a\vay from his office for a while,. he would
sign blank checks and delivery orders and leave them in
his safe:t to be filled in by his employees to cover goods
removed from the warehouse and thereby facilitate the
operations. of defendant's storekeeper last above mentioned
(R. 197~ 198, 206) ~
Defendant offered no evidence to sho\v that the goods
In que ~tion had been delivered in accordance with the
authority which it ~laims to justify such deli very as pleaded
under its affirmative defenses or as contended for under
the pretrial order notv.dthstand ing that defendant singu~
lar ly had within its ov;.rn know ledge and from its daily and
perm anent records and it..~ audits of the warehouse the
timesJ to whom and under ~fhat circumstances the goods in
question ,~~ere delivered from defendant,s 'varehouse (R.
69-71, 77-78, 91-93). On the other hand, uncontradicted
evidence adduced by plaintiff shows that a substantial part
of the goods in question 'vere shipped out of the warehouse
by the defendant many months prior to the dates of the
checks or delivery orders covering the goods which are the
subject of this action (Exhibit uP-20'~t Appendix uEjt).
t

And it is a reasonable inference from the record J that all
the goods in question \\~ere delivered out of the warehouse
to third persons a considerable time prior to the dates of
the delivery orders and checks (Exhibit oi~P-3,~) which 'vere
received by plaintiff after defendant had closed its warehouRe where the goods had been stored.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The evidence supports the finding that the defendant made delivery of goods covered by nonnegotiable
\varehouse receipts held by plaintiff \vithout authority from
plaintiff a~ required by the lit.ah Uniform 'Varehouse Receipts Act~
2. The evidence supports the findings that defendant
had no la\vful excuse for the delivery of the goods covered
ty nonn~gotiable 'varehouse receipts held by plaintiff.

3.

It was not error to allow p]aintiff's cost bilL

4.

It was not error to deny

defendant~s

motion for a

ne1v triaL
ARG"ClVIEKrr
POI~T

NO. 1

THE EVIDENC:E SUPPORTS THE FINDING
THAT THE DEFENDANT rviADE DELIVERY
OF GOODS COV"ERED B 1~ NONNB(;QTIABLE
\VAREHOUSE RECEIPTS HELD BY PLAINTIFF \VITI-lOUT AU·THORITY FROM PLAI~
TIFF AS REQL"IRED BY THE UTAH L~NI
FORM WAREHOUSE· RECEIPTS AC~r.
The 'v.arehouse receipts v,rere i~~ued under the Uniform
Warehouse Receipts Aet found in Title 72, Utah Code
1

Annotated 1953t wherein under Section 72-1-2 it is provided that in the case of nonnegotiab]e receipts the receipts
should provide that the goods 'vilJ be delivered to a specific
person. In the light of this section and ~ince the warehouse
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receipts are designated as nonnegotiable, the receipt~ must
be construed as pro vi ding that the goods described therein
\VouJd be delivered upon the \Vritten order of plaintiff for
whose account the goods ~rere stored. The warehouse receipts so provide. In addition, the delivery orders issued

by the defendant 'varehou~c ad dressed to it, and delivered
to the plaintiff bank for i t.s signature, provide that ~(.you

are hereby authorized to deliver to John R. Woods Company'' the goods described in the deli very order~ which
goods are Iik ewis e described in the warehouse receipl~ held
by the bank. Hence, the delivery orders supplied by the
warehouse company for use in an of the transactions with
plain tiff expressly recognize the statutory requirement that
defendant deliver said goods on]y to a person "''who has
\vritten authority from'' plaintiff.
The provisions of the Utah statute applic.able to this
aetion concerning nonnegotiable warehouse receipts are
as folJows ~
'~72~ 1- 9..

J u8tif ication of warehouseman in delivering.-A warehouseman is justified in deliver. .
ing the goods, subject to the provisions of the three
following sections, to one who is :
"'" ( 1) The person lawfully entitled to the possession of the goods, or his agent;
""(2) A person who is either himself entitled
to deli very by the termH of a nonnegotiable receipt
issued for the goods~ or \Vho has \\'ritten authority
from the person su enti tied either indorsed upon
the receipt or 'vritten upon another paper; or * * *

*

* *

~ ~72-1-1 0~

livery.~Where

liability for misde~
a \varehouseman delivers the goods

Warehouseman~s
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to one who is not in fact lawfully entitled to the
pus se~ Hio n of them, the \V arehouseman shall be ]iable
as for conver~lon to al1 having a right of property
or possession in the goods~ if he delivers the goods
other\vise than as authorized by subdivisions (2)
=;.:
* of the preceding ~ection; * * * "
:-to:

The ",.arehouse receipts in question provide that the
~'res ponsi hili ty of the \V are houseman with respect to the
goods in Htorage is defined in the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act of the State ,Nherein the \varehouse is located~"
Defendant contends that someone other than the plain~
tiff bank was entitled to possession of the goods covered
by the warehouse receipts held by plaintiff, and, therefore,
that the \V r itten authority required by the statute was unnecessary~ Fin ding No. 2 entered by the trial court in this
action

provide~

as follu\VS :

'"At all times herein mentioned plaintiff wasJ
and no\v is, the la wfu I holder of said warehouse
receipts, entitled to delivery of the goods therein
named by the terms of said receipts;! and lawfully
entitlen to possession of the goods named therein
and hereinbelow described.'~
Hence~

the trial court has found that the contract between
the parties is as contained in the warehouse receipts, \vh i ch
incorporates the Utah act by reference+ The elements under
the Utah statute are found in plaintiff's favor, including
the element that pI a inti ff is lawfully entitled to possess ion
of the goods covered by the \Varehouse receipts. As set
forth in detail in the Statement of Fact~~ ~Ir~ C. J. Holt,
Vice President of defendant~ recognized that as far as the
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defendant was concerned the goods belonged to the bank~
\v ere stored for the account of the bankt and that the bank
'\Vas the owner and entitled to possession of the goods once
the warehouse receipts had been issued.
The contention of defendantJs counsel that someone
other than the bank "'~a~ entit1ed to possession of the goods
violates the express terms of the warehouse receipts prepared and issued by defendant, is in derogation of the express terms of the statute, contradirtory of the statements
of def en dan es officer who was in charge of this warehouse~
contrary to the evidence and findings of the lower court,
and unsupported by defendant's authorities~ Moe v. American Jcp & Cold StoTage Company~ 30 Wash. 2d 51, 190 P~
2d 755 (not a VlaTehouseman - depositor relationship);
George v. Beh."ins Van & Storage Compa,ny) 33 Cal. 2d 834:P
205 P. 2d 1037 (goods destroyed by fire - case decided
on the language of the \Varehouse receipt itself) ; Wood v.
Crocker Pir.st .\rationa-l Brrnk~ et a!., 107 Cal. App~ 685, 291
Pac. 221 (actual agency established by recorded power of
attDrney) ; Tra.vers v. Burdge, et al..~ 101 N. J ~ 237 ~ 127 Atl.
191 (depositor in default under mortgage and delivered to
mortgagee pursuant tu mortgage) ; Bunnell \~. WaYd, et aL~
241 ~~ ~ch. 404, 217 N. W 68 (goods deposited by partnership and delivered to one of the partners) ; Fnrmers' Unwn
r

Wa-rehouse Compan11 v. Barnf:tt, et aL, 214 Ala. 202, 107
So. 46 (undisputed title in third party).
Apparently, defend ant's co unse I reaches this interpretation on the baRi.~ of a1leged defenses which we \viii consider in subsequent portions of this brief.. The basic fallacy
of defendant}s argument is that defendant would have the
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appellate court review the evidence and draw inferences
contrary to those drawn by the trial court+
The scope of the appellate court~s review in this case
is so firmly established that we cite only a few of the many
l!tah cases on this subject. In Lynt v. Thompson, 112 Utah
24, 184 P. 2d 667, it was stated:
"But the lower court ha~ seen fit to reject defendan t~s version of the case and the question for
us to decide is not \Vhich of the two sides should be
believed. \Ve are ca1led up-on to decide whether or
not there is evidence in the case that will directly or
by inference support the decision of the trier of the
facts. In deciding that question we decide mereiy
-so far as circumstantial evidence is concernedthat if there are inferences to be drawn therefrom
that will support the lower court's conclusions upon
the probabilities of that evidence, we are bound to
uphoJd the decision, even though had we been trying
the case we might have stressed the inferences adversely to such a conclusion~u

See also John C. Cutler Association v. DeJa.y Stores,
3 U+ 2d 107~ 279 P. 2d 700; Adler v. Clark~ 122 Utah 472,
251 P. 2d 669 .
.A.H further evidence supporting the findings of the
trial court that the contract bet ween the parties consisted
of the e1ements contained in the Ctah Uniform Warehouse
Rece ips Actt the statement of facts herein reviews in some
detail the testimony of defendant'~ witness, H. A+ RobbinsJ
who testified that signed delivery orders were not forwarded to defendant until checks had been paid; that as
far as he knew, in instances when he held a delivery order
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until the check accompanying the sa me had been cleared,
the goods were still in the \Vareho use ; and that he had no
agreement with Woods or the warehouse company that
the goods could be taken from the "\varehouse prior to the
time the deli very order v-.tas signed as required by the Utah
statute. Corroborating the testimony of ltlr. Robbins are
the instruction~ of Mr. T. B. Akeley, an auditor in defendanes Los Angeles office~ particularly concerning the
1va rehouse in which the subject goods were stored, accepted
by ]tfr. 1\'Joorehead, the defendant's storekeeper under date
of April 3, 1957, more than a month before defendant c1osed
said \\-~are h ouge, which instructions reiterated the statu tory
duties of defendant and state expressly that the defendant's
storekeeper ~'1nust actually have in his posse.~sion a. delivery
order specifying the goods t a be delivered~ sign...ed by an

individua-l a.:uthorized to s·ign [01? the BA~.TK before any
goods can be delivered.'' (Emphasis added.) As sho,vn by
the Statement of Facts herein, defendant~s interoffice communications which for convenience of the court appear in
the appendix to this brief, show that the defendant decided
to assume the risk of deli very of the goods without written
authorization from the bank.
Even under facts which show an agreement on the
part of the warehouse receipt holder not to require written
au th orizati on, which does not exist under the evidence and
findings in this case~ the courts construe the statute literally and nonetheless require a written authorization. In
the case of Farmers" Bank of Weston v~ EUi_s, 122 Ore. 266~
258 Pac. 186~ one John H. Grafton deposited potatoes with
the defendant who issued negotiable warehouse receipts~
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The defendant alleged that Grafton had entered into an
agreement \\·ith plaintiff bank that the sale of the perishable potatoes would be negotiated by Grafton as agent for
the bank and that Grafton ~~ou1d deposit the proceeds from
the 8.ale of the potatoes \\o~ith the bank and the warehouse
receipts would be returned to Grafton as the sales .and
de posits \Vere rna de. Defendant further alleged that this
agreement was in accordance with general banking custom
and recognized by the parties. Defendant further contended
that by inadvertence the particu1 ar warehouse r~ ccipts
involved in the action were not returned to Grafton by the
plaintiff.. After a verdict for the defendant, plaintiff appealed citing as error the instructions of the trial court.
The Supreme Court of Oregon held that even assuming the
validity of the facts which defendant alleged to exist, there
was no defense to the action and the judgment \vas reversed
and a new trial directed. In the opinion the court cites a
provision of the t"' niform \Varehouse Receipts Act \\~hich
is identical to our Section 72-1~10 and provi~ions of 8018
Oregon La,vs \vhich are identical to our 72-1-11. The Vtrhole
tenor of the opinion is that written authority is required
by the statute. While the receipts involved in the Ellis case
were negotiable, the dissenting opinion recognizes that the
bank was the person rightfully entitled to possession and
had not transferred the receipts to a bona flde purchaser.
Hence, the negotiability or nonnegotiability of the receipts
in no way is necessary to the court'R conclusions .and reasoning s i nee the effect of negotiating comes into p1ay oniy
when the warehouseman fails to take up a receipt and it
has been transferred for value to a bona fide purchaser+
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ThiR element is not involved in the EUis case nor in our
case and does not add nor detract from the rule for which
the Ellis case is cited~ The Supreme Court of Oregon ho Jds :
'"We take it that the object of the law~ as shown
by its many provisionst was to see that each step
taken, beginning with the deposit in the warehouse
and the issuing of the receipt to the final deli very
of the goods by the warehouseman to the holder of
the recei pt:P should be evidenced by .some sta tem.ent
in writing, so as to completely preclude any attempt
by an unauthorized person to get possession of the
property.~~

In the second appeal of this case~ Farmers" Ba-nk of
Weston v. Ellis, 126 Ore. 602, 268 Pac. 1009~ the Supreme
Court of Oregon affirmed its previous ho1d1ng and stated
that any contractual dealings between the bank and the
depositor of the goods are immateria I ; in the case now
before the court, Mr~ Holt states expressly that he had no
know ledge of contractual negotiations between plaintif£
and Woods~ and Holt admit8 that any dealings between the
bank and Woods were of no concern to the warehouse company.

Concerning the dissent 'vhich appears in the first EUis
decision, it is interesting to note that J. Rand, who dissented, finally concurred with a unanimous court in the
second appeal. The dissent is important because it reviews
facts which did not affect the judgment of the majority~
and more important~ do not exist in any degree- in the pres..
ent litigation: the oral contract was clear and express and
conformed with general custom; the bank was tendered
the proceeds of the sale which was for the full market
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value of the goods~ there was a showing of agency by an
express agreement. As indicated above, we cite this case
because it demonstrates the policy of the la\v requiring
written authority even under extreme facts; \Ve do not
concede that such facts reviewed in the Ell:is case exist in
the case no'v before the court. Indeed, the evidence and findings expressly negate the ~xistence of such facts.
In the ca~(~ of Voyt v. Bekim Movin,g & Storage Company, 1.69 Ore . 30, 119 P . 2d 586, the court states that a
warehouse Teceipt ordinarily constitutes the contract between the parties and holds that the right to insert in the
warehouse receipt terms and conditions other than those
required by statute does not give to such terms the force
of contract unless it can be fairly said that the minds of
the parties have met thereon. \Ve will again call attention
to this rule ''"'hen we discuss the affiTmative clef en.ses raised
by defendant in thi~ action.
Defendant attempL8 to avoid the judgment on the untenable theory that plaintiff failed to make out a prima
facie case bef.ause plaintiff had made no demand of defendant for return of the goods and had failed to make an
offer to satisfy the warehcuseman's lien. In the first place.,
contrary to defendant's contention, there is no question
before this appelJate court as to 'vhether plaintiff made
out a prima facie case ""'~hen it res ted .at the cone l us ion of
its evidence in chief and defendant interposed a motion
to dismiss (R. 42), as the eourt declined to render any
judgment until the close of al1 the evidence (R~ 49, 65, 74,
75) ~ and then made findings of fact and conclusions of laTh~
and entered judgment herein on all the material and com-
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petent evi de nee adduced by both parties. Rule 41 (b) ~ Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, defendant 'vaived its
right to object on the ground its motion to dismiss was
erroneously denied by proceeding to introduce evidence.
Centuru Indemnity Co. v . 1Velsont 90 F4 2d 644 (C. C. A.
9th, 1936).
Furthermore, the alleged failure of p1aintiff to make
a demand for the return of the goods or offer to satisfy
defendantts warehouse charges did not operate to shift defendant~s burden of proof.. In the first place, defendant
overlooks the undisputed fact that the \Varehouse charges
had been paid and that defendant had delivered the goods
to someone other than the plaintiff prior to defendant's
closing the \varehouse where the goods were stored. It is
elementary that demand for delivery and tender of charges
is not re(1uired \\~here it would serve no useful purpose,. such
as \vhen the warehouseman has received his storage charges
and has put it out of his po\ver to deliver the goodst ~ 's i nee
a vain a.nd useless act is not required by the depositor or
receipt holder+~~ 56 Am . Jur., Warehouse, Section 191; 93
C . J. S.t Warehouseman and Safe Depositories, Sections
72c and 51; State ex r.eL Hermann ReitmeieT v. Oakley,
129 Wash~ 553~ 225 Pac~ 425; State v. Farmers~ Elevator
Compan·y, 59 N. D. 679, 231 N. W. 725; Cody Vr Miner, 91
Ohio App. 36, 102 N. E. 2d 727. Hence) delivery of tbe
goods with out authority from the plain tiff ''renders the
Vtt'areh ou seman liable without a demand.~~ 56 Am. J ur .,
Warehouse~ Section 191. Moreover, under the general law
in an action for conversion, the '~defend ant bears the burden 'of proof as to any affirmative matter set up by him
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as a defense to the action~~t 53 Am . Jur., Trover and Conversion, Section 176.
POI~T

NO. 2

THE E 1/IDENCE SUPPORTS THE FI~DINGS
THAT DElr""ENDANT HAD NO LAWFUL EXCUSE FOR THE DELIVERY OF THE GOODS
COVERED BY NO~NEGOTIABLE WAREHO"GSE RECEIPTS HELD BY PLAINTIFF.
The existence of a la,vful excuse for deli very without
having obtained written authority from plaintiff is pleaded
and actually constitutes aQ affirmative defense to plaintiff's complaint, as to vlhich defendant had. the burden of
proof. Defendant failed completely to diHcharge this burden. The only evidence offered by defendant concernH inspections made by defendant's officers and only general
statements of the results of these inspections were offered
in evidence. The reliability and probative va1ue of the
inspections were rendered meaning less by the admlgslons
of defendant in its interoffice communications that shortages existed in the 'varehous e, that the 'varehouse was not
being operated properlyt and that Woods completely controlled the warehouse~ Let us now consider the affirmative
defenses raised by defendant~

There 1va.s no ·tc ri t ten ant horit lJ ·~t hi ch a.'~.l thoriz ed del enda.nt to deliver the goods f J"'om the warehouse.
The court entered findingR as foHows ~
~'At

various times commencing on or about September 28, 1956~ the defendant, in the absence of
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Ia wful excuse, without authority from plaintiff~: and
contrary to its obligations and duties as a. warehouseman~ de livered to a person or persons who "~ere
not la¥-Tfu11y entitled to the possession thereof~ nor
entitled to delivery by the terms of the said receipts~
nor having authority from the plaintiff who was
so en tit 1ed~ certain goods covered by said warehouse
receipts.

*

~

*

'That p1 aintiff made no representations to defendantt either expresH or implied by course of conduct~ or other,vise~ upon which defend ant relied and
~rhich could form the basis in fact or in law of any
estoppel or contract imp lied in fact; and that defendant made delivery of said goods v.rithout any authority by p1aintiff and even contrary to the authority
c1 aimed by defendant to exist by reason of any of
the matters pleaded or made an issue in the pretrial
order as a defense to this action . ')
t

'V e ",.i 11 now consider the q u eg,tion of 'vhether there
existed the alleged agreement bet\veen plainti:ff and def en~
dant under 'vhich defendant contends it ·was authorized to
deliver the goods to \Voods upon it~ obtaining from Woods
a check and without obtaining from plaintiff a delivery
order authorizing the delivery of the goods. The sequence
of events leading to the exchange of correspondence which
defendant claims con ~titutcd its authority for the delivery
of the goods without a delivery order is reviewed in the
Statement of Facts herein. It is undisputed that, prior to
said exchange of corre~pondence bebNeen Robbins and Ho1t,
plaintiff in each instance obtained payment of the checks
accompanying the delivery orders before plaintiff executed
and delivered delivet~y orders to defendant. It also is un-
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disputed that from the spring of 1956 until said exchange

of correspondence:t the defendant had no \Vritten authority
to deliver goods covered by warehouse receipts held by
defendant except the authority contained in delivery orders
executed and delivered by plaintiff to defendant (Exhibit
"D-8
On October 16, 1956, plaintiff wrote to the defendant stating that '~these receipts cover appliances and it
i~ our method of operation that these units~ one or more~ be
paid for at the time they are withdra,vn." Mr. Robbins, who
\\~rote the letter :t testified that the letter was not intended
to reflet1 any changes in his methods of operation and that
follo,ving the exchange of correspondence the bank still
obtained payment of the checks accompanying the delivery
orders before plaintiff executed anrl delivered the delivery
orders to defendant.
11

).

The defendant~s 1/"ice President., 1\'Ir. Holt, testified
in effect that he construed the exchange of correspondence
as authorizing defendant to deliver the goods to Woods~
upon receipt only of Woods' check, as provided for by the
proposed instructions enclosed in Holt~s letter for execution
by the bank, but \Vithout any limitations as to the amount
of goods \Vhich could be released at any time upon receipt
of such check. It i~ admitted that the instructions which
Holt proposed that the bank execute and deliver to the defendant, were never executed and delivered and the instructions themselves provide :
,. These instructions executed by us in triplicate
shaH become effective only upon your delivery to
us of a duly executed copy thereof signed by one of
your officers evidencing acceptance of the provhdons
contained herein. l.Tpon becoming effective~ these
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instructions shall supercede all previous instructions
and shall remain in full fol~ce and effect until
amended or cancelled by the bank in writing/t
Hene.e, it a ppe.ars that the a11eged agreement under

which defendant claims to have had authority to deliver
the goods~ is based upon the plai nti ffts failure to reply to
H o1t~s letter a.nd defendant's claim that such correspondence
effected a modification -of defendanes previous obligation
not to deliver the goods from the ~;rarehous e until it had
received a vfritten deli very order from plaintiff authorizing
the same. In fact, by Rome legerdemain defendant reduces
the alleged ag1~eement to a situation "rhere "the plaintiff
\Vanted a \Voods' check, but that it did not care about much
els e-w he ther it was given immediately, before or after
delivery or ~;rhether \Vood.s had money in the bank/" In
other wordsJ defendant argues that by such exchange of
co rres pon dence it thereafter \Vas justified in re li nq uishi ng
control of its \Varehouse to \Voods, provided Woods had
left an unsigned check in his safe.
By the terms of the enc]osure itself~ defendant clearly
recognized that a check was not payment, notwithstanding

Mr. Holt~s testimony that the Vlarehouse company in all its
dealings tl1roughout the United States al,vays interpreted
R receipt holders' instructions to release goods upon payment to mean the goods could be released upon receipt of
a check (R. Sl-82) ~
The la\v is perfectly clear that under the circumstances

of this case a check is not payment. Ashto1t v. Skeenf 85
Utah 489, 39 P. 2d 1073. A check is only conditional pay-
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the condition being its collectibility from the bank
on which it is drawn and in order for a check to constitute
payment an express, p os iti ve and speci fie agreement is necessary . 70 C~ J. S., Payment~ Section 24. Hale v~ Boha·nlVJnJ
88 Cal 2d 458, 241 PL 2d 4; State v. U.S. Steel CorporationJ
12 N~ J~ 38, 95 AtL 2d 734; Paton's Digest of Legal OpinionsJ Vol. 1, Page 1091, cases cited therein.
The law is equally clear that under the circumstances
of this case) the failure uf plaintiff to reply to defendant's
letter of November 12~ 1956 \\- as not sufficient evidence to
establish a modified contract. The enclosure in the letter
expressly stated that it did not become effective until accepted by plaintiff \vhich, of cou1·se~ p1aintiff did not do.
In 17 C~ J. S4,. Contractst Section 4lct it is stated:
7

~"Silence alone,. however, does not give consent,.
even by estoppel, for there must not only be the
right~ but the dut:/ to speak before the failure so to
do can estop a person from afterward setting up the
truth~ particularly \V here the silence or inaction has
an uncertain or ambiguous meaning and the parties
have reasonable differing vie,vs as to \Vhat was in
fact meant.''
1

See also litak State Building Comntission v. Great
Ameriea··n.Indemnity Co-rnpanyJ 105 l}tah 11, 140 P. 2d 763;

Cohen v. Joh-rt.sunJ 91 Fed. Supp. 231 (D. C. Par) ; SecuTity
First 1\'ationaJ Ra-nk of l..tos A n_qele.~ v. Sp-,ing Street PYoperties, 20 CaL App~ 2d 618, 6·7 P~ 2d 720; Hoosier Drilling
Ctnnpanu v. Ellis~ 282 Ky. 137, 137 S. '\Vr 2d 1084.
The case of Voyt v. Bekins llfop·i.ng & Sto1-age Company~
supr~ recognizes the danger in allu\ving modifi~a tions of
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the statu tory con tract resulting from the issuance of a
'varehou.se receipt under the Uniform Actr This is consisten t with the policy of the la~r announced in the case of
Farmers' Ba-nk of Weston v. Etlis, supra, that any '"'other
construction '"Tould leave a loophole in the law which would
render it practically nugatory in many instances~~' Under
the evidence surely it cannot be fairly said that the minds
of the parties have met on any modifications of the statu~
tory cont1·act. The trial court agreed.
The elements of E.Btoppel are Totally Laeking.

The e~s entia I elements of an estoppel are comp1etely
laeking in this case~ These elements are cited in 19 Am.
Jur . ~ Estoppel, Secticn 42, Page 642-43J as follows:
( 1) Conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material !acts~ or~ at
least~ which h~ calculated to convey the impression
that the facts are oth er,vise than, and in consistent
with, those which the party subsequently attempts
to assert ; ( 2) intention, or at least expectation, that
such conduct shall be acted upon by the other party;
(3) kno\vledge:t actual or constructive, of the real
facts. As related to the party claiming the estoppel,
they are: ( 1) Lack of knowledge and of the means
of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question;
(2) reliance upon the condu(·t of the party estopped;
and (3) action based thereon of such a character as
to change hi~ position prejudicially.~"
~~

It ""rould be redundant to consider each of said elements

required to establish an estoppe1 and to demonstrate that
there is a complete lack of supporting evidence~ However:t
"\Ve deem it .advisable to mention again the ·fact that Mr.
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J{olt testified that a~ far as any dealings between Woods
and the bank were concerned. the warehouse company knew
nothing about any such dealings and were not concerned
with them.
The lower court found that no estoppel existed~ Defendant in its brief disregards the testimony of Mr. Holt, the
princjpal witness for defendant, and attempts to twist and

confuse the testimony of Mr.. Robbins, another of defendant)s witnesses . The testimony of Mr. Robbins is reviewed
in detail in the State·ment of Facts~ Defendant finds it convenient to refer only to that portion of his testimony where
he was some\\'hat confused. Again, defendant fails to recognize the rule of reviev,~ in appellate practice~ In the case
of Aluener v. BarnesJ 139 Cal. App. 2d 847 294 P. 2d 505,
the court said ~
1

'~These

\Vere factual matters for the determination of the trial judge who had the responsibility~ in
m·aking the determination, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, the weight that should be
given their testimony t and to res.olve the conflicts
and inconsistencies even in the testimony of an individual witness. Peter.r:urn V~ Peterson, 74 Cat App.
2d 312, 319, 169 P. 2d 474. Such a factual decision
is controlling on appeal.H
The fol1 owing authorities uphold the u nantmous rule
that inconsistencies in the testimony of an individual witness are to be resolved by the trier of the fact and that
under firmly established legal principles the appellate
eourt is not at liberty to re,veigh the evidence and draw

inference contrary to those dra\vn by the trial court: Peterson v. Petersonr 74 Cal. App. 2d 312, 168 P. 2d 474;
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v. Western Paci.fic R. R. Company, 16 Cal. 460 7
106 Pr 2d 895; Suldasian V. Shaka1'ian~ 115 Cat App. 798~
252 P. 2d 956; People v. Alonzo, 158 Cal. App. 2d 45, 322
P. 2d 42~
Shou~alter

Defend ant claims that the lower court erred in not
all 0'\~dng 1'l r. Robbins to testify as to his ~' understanding
of flooring/' On direct examination, Mr. Robbins testified
that he had no kno,vledge of the general class of Woods
clientele and "uidn't. kno"T \vho the merchandise vras being
sold to or under what terms or anything else~'' In redirect
examination, 1VIr. Roe attempted to impeach his own witness
by a q ue.stion 'vhich was inherently based on surmiseJ: hear..
say and conclusions. In the ~ase of Hamen v. Hamen~ 110
Utah 222, 171 P. 2d 392~ 394, this court stated~
''Certain answers to questions involved surmise,
hearsay and conclusions~ The court did not err in
not receiving them in evidence. Indeed the court
could not base any fin ding on such ans'v ers without
indu]ging in speculation."
See also: Farmer1>' an.d Merchants Savings Bank V.
Jenswr~.-, 64 Utah 609~ 232 Pac~ 1084~
Questions of materiality and relevancy rest largely in
the discretion of the trial court and the trial judge may
exc] ude evidence ·which is remote or of comparatively little
probative force~ The determination as to when a matter so
lacks ~ ignifi can ce or rna ter iali ty as to justify exclusion is
within the trial eourt~s discretion. Independent School District No~ .:L~ V~ Weinmann, 243 Minn. 469, 68 Nr W. 2d 248~
Testa v . Jletropolita:n Life In.su1+anee Company!i 136 N. J.
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9t 54 Atl. 2d 455; BjoYkrt~an v. To·wn of ;_\/e'"tvingtonJ 113
Conn.. 181:. 154 A_ tl. 346.
L~

The testimony solicited by Mr. Roe both on direct and
redirect examination of ~lx·. Robbins was clearly an attempt
to impeach his o\vn witness and \Vas improper~ Schlatter
v. JlcCarthuJ 113 Utah 543:. 196 P+ 2d 968~ rehearing denied,
113 Utah 560, 198 P ~ 2d 173 ; X eru:Lkis v~ Garrett Freight
Lines~ Inc~J 1 U. 2d 299t 265 P. 2d 1007~ The citations to
~IcCormick, Wigmore and Jones in defendant's brief do not
refer to impeachment of a 1vitness by asking that 'vitness
questions, but refer rather to the introduction of contradictory evidence by another witness. Defendant is confused
on the application of the doctrine relied upon.
Even if it be assume-d that an. allt~g ed agre em ~nz.t existed
u:hich autho·rized de!eudattt's de.livePy of goods de8cribed
in the deli-very o-rders upon receipt of lVoods:. checks~ the
evidence sho·u;s that defendant delivered tlw goods in question contrary to such a-n aUeged agreement.
In this regard, the trial court found in finding No~ 6
that ~'defendant made de:livery of said goods without any
authority by plaintiff and even contrary to the authority
claimed by defendant to exist by reaHon of any of the matters pleaded or made an issue in the pretrial order as a

defense to this

action~"

In introducing this phase of our brief, "\Ve point out
that the \Varehouse should have been at a 1l times under the
supervision and control of defendant. But the defendant~s
officers and employee~ sa~;r fit to rcHnquish control of the
warehouse to Woods. The defendant allo,ved goods to be
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withdrawn from the warehouse at random, with only a
blank check left in Woods~ safe, supposedly supporting the
accumulation of deliveries while Woods was a-\vay from
his off ice~ This '"as done by rl ef en dan t with f u 11 know led.ge
that \Voods was financially insolvent, prompting defen~
dant'.s storekeeper to quit his job because~ as stated by the
tria1 courtt he "\Vas abandoning a sinking ship.
Only the defend ant was in a position to insure the valid
operation of the "' areh ouse. It was the defendant that set
up the \\,..arehouse and had the duty to see that the goods
~~ere properly segregated~ identified and delivered ; the
~efendant is in the warehouse business; it was paid for its
services; only defendant \Vas entitled to control the operations of the warehouse.

Evi de nee as to the time deliveries took place from the
\varehouse was fui 1y 'v ithin the possession of the defendant~
but no such evidence 'vas offered by defendant at the triaL
Why~ Because it knew of the condition of the warehouse;
that the goods had been delivered out of the \Varehouse
contrary to its obligations as a '\\~"arehouseman and hoped
that it could avoid its responsibility by attempting to place
the blame on p1 aintiff. It is inconceivable that the vague
testimony of Robbins that a pproximateJy four inspections
made by an unknown employee of plaintiff of the general
condition of the warehouse, \V here no reports were made
to p 1a in tiff's officers, could operate to shift the responsi bility of \Varehouse management to plaintiff~ ·Plaintiff is in
the banking and not the 'varehouse business and the risk
of seeing to it that the \varehouse is being properly managed is on the warehouse company a.nrl not the bank+
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Concerning the delivery of merchandise from the warehouse~ defendant~g

storekeeper, Robert RL 7vloorehead., testi-

fied thatt even though the instructions quoted in the State-

ment of Facts herein specifically governed his duties and
responsibilities in the operations of this warehouse, the
goods \Vere delivered by him from the -.,varehouse "\\ i thout
complying 'vith the instructions.
7

In addition, Mr. 1\'Ioorehead identified Exhibits

HP-lri~'

to '~P-19~' ~ inclusive~ as true and correct copies of Woods'
invoices which. he had prepared (R. 170~ et seq.). These
invoices were also certified by the United States District
Court as true and correct copies of documents on file in
the Bankruptcy Division of that court.. This certification
was completed pursuant to the pretrial order to forestall
any objections as to the admissibility of copies. The ma~
teriality of these invoices is clearly shown on Exhibit
"P-20'~, appended to this brief, since merchandise is identified by serial number on the invoices as the same merchandise identified by serial number on the delivery orders covering the merchandise upon \V hi c.h this action is base d.. The
important fact iH that the invoices show deliveries long
before the date when the delivery orders and checks were
delivered either to defendant or plaintiff in May of 1957.

Defendant objects to the materiality of these invoices
of Woods. In the case of Adler v . Clark!' 122 Utah 472, 251
P. 2d 669 the court held that invoices provided ample evidence to support the findings of the court concerning mert

previous balance~ payments
and credit~. Similarly, the courts universally recognize th.at
invoices and other similar data taken from the records of
chan di.se

furnished~ charges~
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a company are sufficient to sho\v delivery of the merchandise: Wi_ley & Foss~ Inc~ v. Saxony Theat-res~ 332 1\fass. 172,
124 N+ E . 2d 903; East Basitt Oit & Urat1.lum Company v.
Pound, 321 P. 2d 694~ (Okla.~ 1958) ; Albert S. Ef1..8twomi
Luntber Compa-ny v. Rrittoi' 51 R. I. 406, 155 Atl. 354; McKn·ight v. Atuiersonj 76 Ga. App+ 81~ 44 S4 E. 2d 814r
Moreover, it is the prerogative of the trial court to
determine \vhen a sufficient foundation is 1aid and when
there is established sufficient credibility of the evidence.
State v. Da-vie, 121 Utah 189, 240 P. 2d 265; Zeigl.er Milling
ConPpan-y v. Denman, 79 Ohio App~ 250~ 72 Nr E. 2d 686~
The foregoing revie\v of the evidence of Harvey R.
1\'loorehead~ "\Vhich alone supports the findings of the court~
does not inc1ucte any reference to his testimony before the
Referee in Bankruptcy of the United States District Court
"\vhieh wag received in evidence in the tria1 of this case.
Defendant no\v objetts to this testimony and states that it
is proper only for impeachment purposes. Admittedly~ the
testimony served to impeach tl1 G testimony of :\Ir. )'Ioore-head, but it also '1t.:ras n1aterial to the issues in this case~ In
the course of the testimony~ the defendant failed to enter
any objection to this evidence except \vhen the invoices
themseivr.~ 'VC1'G offered and these \Vere identified by testimony of IVI r ~ lVIoorehe ad on both direct and eros s examination as having be en prepared by him. The bankruptcy testimony vlas admissible for evidentiary purposes if only because of the defendant's failure to object.. In Child v. Chlrd~
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981~

one of appellantts alleged errors
was the admission of hearsay evidence. The court stated:

8 U. 2d 261 332 P. 2d
1

Hit is urged that as this is an out of court declaration offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, it is hearsay and therefore incompetent
;i;
* * Whatever merit there may have been to
this objection~ the defendant is no'\v precluded from
voicing it.. The testimony 1Nas elicited \vithout objection. This con~tituted a 'N·aiver of the right to
question its competency. And the evidence being so
received could be relied upon as proof of the fact
to which it related.n
In any eventt the testimony of 1VIoorehoad before the
bankruptcy court \Vas admissible as an admission again~t

defendant's interest by its employee~ defendant having
vouched for his credibility by calling him a.s a \vitness. 31
C. J. S., Evidence, Sec~ 311~ Se·~~ 353. The invoices of 'Voods
prepared by ~Ioorehead are like~Tise admissible solely as
admission ag-~dnst interest. B·ro1vrdng v. Equitable l.~ife
A sura nee s Of..~ie ty o.f the l.l ;~1:t~'ti .States, 94 Utah 532, 7 4 p
r

2d 1060.

Regard1ess of the admisHihi1ity of any of the evidence
complained oft there is abundant evidence to ~upport the
findings and judgTIIent of the trial court, and the appellate
court must presume tln1.t the trial court in arriving at its
judgment considered only that cvidcnc~ \vhi~h \Viu~ material,
cotnpeten t and relevant~ Christ ens en v ~ J ohm ot&, 90 Utah
273, 61 P. 2d 597: FedeTal l..a·1:d Bank of Berkeley v. Salt
Lake Vullf?J SaFd & Gra,·re!. Company,. 96 Utah 359, 85 P.
2d 791; Big Cottontoood TanneT D·it . :·h Compa-n-y v. Kay, 108
Utah 110, 157 P. 2d 795.
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Defendant complains because the trial court rejected
an offer of proof that Moorehead \VOU ld testify that his
testimony before the bankruptcy court must have been in
·error since defendant~s officers~ from time to time, conducted inspections of the warehouse. This is the same vague
proof upon which defendant relies to fulfill the burden of
showing that deliveries v..~ere made in accordance with its
alleged modified contract. The trial court properly rejected
the offer because it \Vas an attempt by defendant to impeach
his O\Vn \Vitness t Silva v.. Pickard~ 10 Utah 78, 37 Pae~ 86 ;
Senn v. Lac"'?Ler, 91 Ohio App. 83, 100 N . E. 2d 419; State
v. Bagley~ 229 N. C. 723, 51 S. E. 2d 298, "\\,.as founded on
hearsay~ ~~as vague and indefinite, and was admittedly
speculative. Hansm v. Hawen, 110 Utah 222J 171 P. 2d
392; Elizabeth Trust Comprtny V~ Williams, 128 N. J. L.
102, 23 AtL 2d 569.
Finally~

the defendant admits that perha p8 ~~defen
dant breached a contractual duty when it did not transmit
delivery orders and checks on a dai1y basis ; perhaps it 'v~
a hl"'each to take post-dated checks ~
$
*'~ But the ad·
mitted breach could only be that the deliveries were im~
proper~ and if the deliveries \Vere improper there was a
conversion and plaintiff is entitled to judgment~ So said
the tria1 court.

POINT

NO~

3

IT WAS NOT ERROR TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S

COST BILL.
Plaintiff"s cost bill was not verified, but v.~as signed by
its attorney who thereby certified that it was read and to
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the best of his kno'v ledge, information and be lief there was
good ground to support it~ Rule 11, Utah RuleH of Civil
Procedure~ It is submitted that there \Va8, substantial comPliance with the statute and that the amended cost bill was
properly allo,ved~ Vi_qnan v. N el.son~ 26 Utah 186t 72 Pac.
936.

POINT

~0~

4

IT \VAS NOT F:RROR TO DENY DEFEN-

DAl\.. T'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
The affidavit in support of the motion for a new trial
does not make a showing of ~~newly discovered evidence,
material for the party making the applicationt 'v hi ch he
cou1d not, \Vith reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial." Rule 59 (a) ( 4), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The question of delivery of the merchandise was raised
at the pretrial and made a specific issue in that hearing
and the pretriaJ order placed the burden upon the defendant. Similar1y) defendant was advised of the han kr uptcy
proceedings at the pretrial and stipulated as to the man~
ner of introducing tiocument.~ of John R. Woods Company
on fi1e with the bankruptcy court~ The bankruptcy proceedings constituted an open forum and defendant had an
equa1 opportunity with plaintiff to appear and examine the
books and records of John R. Woods Company and the witnesses appearing in those proceedings. Mr~ l\ioorehead was
defendant's own 'vitness and a former employee of defendant, who was available in Salt Lake City for subpoena and
has been .avai1able in Salt Lake City during the entire pen-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40

dency of this action~ When Mr~ Moorehead \Vas asked in
the trial if he recalled his testimony before the bankruptcy
court~ he replied, "You bet." Prior to the trial~ if defendant's attorney had asked a similar question of his witness~
he would have received a similar an~ wer ~ Surely~ the de~
fendant cannot claim that it has exercised due and reasonable dilligence to procure evidence before the trial which
it no ""r says \Vas influential and material to the outcome.
Such a showing is mandatory. Van Dyke v. Ogden Sa-vings
Bank 48 Utah 606~ 161 Pac. 50.
1

Moreover~

the claim of ne\v ly discovered evidence could
not 1egally af feet the result of this action, s i nee it has no
probative value and as sho~rn by this brief) the ovenvhelming weight of the evidence supports the findings of the
court.
CONCLUSIONS
It is submitted that the findings of the trial court are
sup ported by the evidence and the judgment is in accordance with the law .
Respectfully

submitted~

RAY, RAWLINS;, JONES
& HENDERSON~
By C. E. Henderson,
Donald B. Holbrook~

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respmultmt.
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APPENDIX ''A''
T. B. Ake1ey

Los Angeles 16
Thomas Clines- New York

February lt 1957
Attachment to Audit Report
January 17, 1957
John R. \Vood~ Co.~ ~2552

During my audit of October 17J 1956 I found considerable
~hortages~ s-ome overages, erroneous records and goods in
\rarehouse other than those on receipt. I spent much time
in instructing the employees in each step of re-organizing
the wareh ouge ~ clearing the records~ breaking in the new
Asst. Storekeeper and obtaining releases~ etc. to conect
inventory.
During the current audit I found lesser shortages~ but shortages nevertheless ; also over ages~ erroneous records and
even more goods not on receipt in more spots within our
area.. The reasons for this condition ( \V hi ch I understand
has been pretty consistent) lie, I believe, in the personality
of :Mr. \Voods.
Mr. \Voods is a very nice guy, probably as honest as anyone
but hets a very nervous, highflying character and very, very
ov-erbearingr He is full of "yes, ok, fineJ .anything you want~
we']] do it right now~ great, goodbye etc.'' So full that he
never hear's what you are telling him. Frankly, he run's
the warehouse~ and he wil1 continue to do so \Vith uny emPloyees \Ve might put in there, outside of o urse1ves.
As far as ful1 cooperation in operation of '"~arehouse is concerned, vVoods 'vill pay-off any shortage very quickly and
look for the reasons Ia ter ~ but that doesn't improve our position any and short of this he has to be clubbed into submission on every point.
Jack and I have discussed this at length again and both feel
very unsafe in this account. For the revenue involved it
seems that almost any excuse to get out of it would be a
welcome event.
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APPENDIX

~'B~'

New York

J. Gevertz

C. J. Holt- Los Angeles

February 4, 1957
John R. Woods Co.
\Vhse #2552

Thomas Clines- New York
T. B. Akeley- Los Ange1es

We have the January 17th report covering audit at the sub-.j ect~ There is no indication of the amount of the discrepancy but nevertheless vt~e did have overages and shortages.
There was a pet·iod of time when Jocal accountants were
checking this account and \Vith nearly no exception the
warehouse checked properly continuously4 We have pres ume (sic~) that these reports were factual.
In the last six or seven months \Ve have had increasing difficulties to secure monthly checks from this company and
now we are faced \vith poor control.
The memo from Akeley indicates that he discussed this
account with you and it is doubtful that it can be properly
handled due to the domination of Mr. Woods.
Unless this account can be brought into 1ine so that we have
no mere than no rma1 rit-Jk we cannot continue~ If proper
safeguards cannot be taken we have no other alternation
(sic~) but to give notice and close out.
PJease follow thru and advise .
JB~BJ
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APPENDIX ''CH
NEW YORK
C. J. Holt~ Los Angeles

J. Gevertz
February 19, 1958
John R. 'Voods Co.
Whse tt2552

We have not heard further from you regarding the status
of this account.
Advise.

JB:BJ

Los Angeles
J. Gefertz
Feb~ 19, 1957

C. J, Holt
Feb. 21, 1957
John R~ Woods Co.
Whse #2552

'Ve have checked \Vith the Storekeeper a couple of times and
had him -~end inventories in to us and report his actions
other tha11 on the Daily Reportt so feel that this is fairly
accurate at the rnoment.
I\f r. Woods "\Vas here in Los Angeles last 'veek and I had a
long talk 'vith him and sugge~ted that \vith the size of his
present in~~-~ntory he can get along \Vithout the v.,"'a.rehouHe
operation. I think \Ve \Vill get out of this 'vith the good will
of a]] persons concerned and lhTithin the next month. Akeley
\vill b~ in SaJt Lake City in a coup1e of "veeks on the regu]ar
audit S\Ving and 'vill follo'v up on the closing out of the
0 peration. Since r~Ir. 'v oods has a good standi n_g V.='i th the
Bank as .a distributor and also with some of his Huppliers
(Ben Hur J\-Tfg·. Co+ included) I V{ould rather this closed out
on a friendly h:L~i~ rather than having to n-otif~{ receipt
holders to take delivery
In the meantime \Ve are watching the flow of paper carefully and checking as best we can from here~ Actual1y
'Voods got a little overextended by putting some $10,000.00
into a housing deal and this is going a little slow at the
moment, so while he i~ very short of cash he is not broke.
r
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~"D'~

Los Angeles 16
T+ B. Akeley

l\iay

6~

H. R. MooreheadJ Storekeeper
Warehouse 2552

1957

De1 ivery Instructions

Until further notice from me or from my Los Angeles Off]ce
no further goods may be delivered or removed from our
leased \V areho use Area
T. B. Akeley
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'~E)~

WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY
- vs -

NEW YORK TER:\'liR AL 'V AREHOUSE CO., INC.

Com paris on Schedule
John R. \:V.oods Company Invoices
and \V.arehouse Receipts Delivery Orders
(1)

---·----

Date .and No.
of Deli very
Order Unuel'
Whse+ Receipts+

5/1/57-1026

(2}

.

-··-~

-~--~------------

(3)

Date and No~
of ..J. R. 'V oo dR
Invoice~ a.nd
to 'Vhom DeliveJ"Cd

Description and
Serial No. of
Appliance~ Appearing
in Both ( 1) and ( 2) ~

------~-~~--

11/7/56~2033

REDISCO

232X Washers:

85259
85258
85257
85256
85255
85254

5/2/57-1027

11/17/57-2349
People'~ Finance

232X Washers:
85288

85295
85289

9 . ..:'28/56-1852
Continental Bank

85288

85295
5/3/57-1028

9/28/56~1852

85292

Continental Bank
11./7. /?i ~1-2033
REDISCO

85250

10/10/56-1892
REDISCO

85265

85233
85268

85266
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(1)

Date and No.
of Delivery
Order Und-er
Whse. Rcecipts.

5/7./57-1029

(3)

(2)
Date and No.
of J ~ R. \Vood:s

Invoice- and
to Whom Delivered

1/17/57~2349

Description and
Serial No~ of
Appliances Appearing
) n -~otl!_j -~) a~d (2).

232X Washers;

85291

People's Finance
5/l /57-2697
Refrigeration
Discount Corp.

332X Washers:
79141

79183
79177

375

Washers~

74995

84404

78331 84402
78332

84380

78328 84406
78250

78322
84391
84405

9 /28/" 56-1852
Continental Bank

375 Washer:
84201
332X 'V ashers ~
83704

232X Washer~
85291
11 . . . 7 /56-2033

332X Washers:

83106
83103

REDISCO
232X

Washers~

85246
85242

85251
85249
85247

85273
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84428
84379

84347

